Albanian British Chamber of Commerce and Industry ABCCI
A pattern of procurement abuse, exposed by World Bank findings and now under investigation by SPAK, explains why €3.8 billion in public spending has left Albania with crumbling roads—and reveals what action ABCCI’s member companies are demanding from the government.
12 March 2026
Tirana – In September 2022, the Albanian government announced a major victory for transpare
ncy and international expertise. Royal Haskoning DHV, a respected Dutch engineering firm, had been awarded a €13.8 million contract to design the new port at Porto Romano—a project Prime Minister Edi Rama described as destined to be served by “the largest studio in the world and with the most absolute reputation in the world for the construction of infrastructure” .
But what happened next reveals a deeper dysfunction in how Albania manages its public investments. By June 2024, the government had authorized the Durrës Port Authority to directly negotiate with the same Dutch company for “consultancy agreements” covering “the processes of competition, contracting, construction and supervision of the new integrated port” .
The company that designed the project would also sit on the Bid Evaluation Committee, deciding which competitors were disqualified and which company would win the construction tender.
Designer, judge, and jury.
On March 11, 2026, the tender for Porto Romano’s construction was cancelled after the only remaining bidder, Archirodon, failed to submit a financial offer. The project now faces an uncertain future—but the questions raised by its procurement process extend far beyond a single cancelled tender.
They go to the heart of why Albania has spent €3.8 billion on roads since 2014, yet sees newly built infrastructure crumbling within months .
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The Porto Romano Case: A Study in Procurement Failure
The Porto Romano saga contains all the elements of a textbook case in how not to manage strategic infrastructure.
First, there is the question of the feasibility study itself. Urban planner Artan Kaçani has pointed to previous construction attempts in the Porto Romano area where “20-meter columns were swallowed by the ground. The columns have disappeared.” He warns that “the merging of tectonic plates is not a joke. It is something very serious, which tomorrow will put all investments at risk” .
A credible feasibility study would have resulted in a design that accounts for these conditions. Yet when investigators sought to examine the study, the Durrës Port Authority refused to release it .
Second, there is the conflict of interest. The EU’s 2025 Progress Report explicitly criticizes the transitional provisions in Albania’s procurement law that allowed direct negotiation with Royal Haskoning DHV, noting this “continues to raise concerns about its compatibility with the European Union model” .
Third, there is the NATO dimension. The initial master plan did not include the naval base at all—despite public statements positioning Porto Romano as a strategic NATO asset. An additional €2.2 million was added to the contract after it was signed because the original infrastructure “did not meet the capacities required by NATO” . This means the feasibility study was conducted for a different project than the one now being proposed.
Fourth, there is the intervention of international partners. In March 2026, Grant Van Cleve, head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Albania, wrote directly to Prime Minister Rama warning that “the current design of Porto Romano is extremely small: 1,400 meters of quay wall; 2.38 hectares of port area… A small Porto Romano will remain a secondary national port.” He requested that the tender be “postponed and reviewed based on the latest NATO and Corridor 8 requirements” .
The US Chamber does not typically intervene in foreign port tenders. That it did so here speaks volumes.
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A Systemic Pattern: What SPAK Has Uncovered
The Porto Romano case might be dismissed as an isolated incident were it not for a series of investigations by Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption Prosecution (SPAK) that reveal a consistent pattern of procurement abuse across the infrastructure sector.
On November 20, 2025, SPAK charged Deputy Prime Minister and Infrastructure Minister Belinda Balluku with violating equality in tenders linked to two major projects: the €219 million Llogara Tunnel and the €23.85 million Tirana Outer Ring Road (Lot 4) .
According to prosecutors, Balluku “together with members of the Bid Evaluation Committee… allegedly predetermined the outcome of the procurement process, granting unjust advantages and privileges to the winning consortium” . The investigation found that she “monitored and controlled every step of the project and preselected the winning bidder in breach of procurement rules” .
The Special Court ordered Balluku suspended from public office and barred from leaving the country. Her subordinates—Albanian Road Authority (ARRSH) Director Gentian Gjyli and KESH administrator Erald Elezi—were placed under house arrest .
In its ruling, the court noted that “the risk to the investigation is substantial because authorities are reviewing documents originating from the defendants’ own institutions and questioning officials who report directly to them.” The defendants, the court found, could interfere with or destroy evidence, and “their positions and access to public funds create a risk of future offenses” .
Political analyst Lutfi Dervishi told OCCRP that the ruling “forces the government to admit that the failures are not with others, but within its own courtyard,” arguing that it reflects “an old political culture that hides behind the façade of reforms” .
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The Cost of a Broken System: €3.8 Billion and Crumbling Roads
The human and economic cost of these procurement failures is now visible across Albania’s landscape.
According to data from the Ministry of Finance, Albania has invested approximately €3.8 billion in road infrastructure between 2014 and 2026 . With this amount, analysts note, the country could have built 350 kilometers of new Type A highway from scratch—spanning the entire length of the country from Vermoshi to Konispol .
Instead, what Albanians have gotten is a series of projects that fail within months of completion.
The Qukës–Qafë Plloçë road is perhaps the most egregious example. Tendered in 2014 with a Saudi Fund loan, the 43-kilometer project took 11 years to complete at a cost of €260 million . Lot 3 alone—just 9.5 kilometers—ballooned from $25 million to nearly $50 million .
A month after its inauguration, with Prime Minister Rama and Deputy Prime Minister Balluku celebrating on camera, this axis collapsed. All it took was a heavy rain .
The Albanian Supreme Audit Institution (KLSH) had warned of exactly this outcome, pointing out that the construction was done “without considering its shape, expansions, or protection from landslides” .
The Korça–Ersekë road tells a similar story. Costing €80 million for 35 kilometers, the project was supposed to be completed in June 2023. The deadline was postponed by a year—not because of delays, but because the road did not wait for the inauguration to collapse . It is currently under investigation by SPAK .
The Arbër Road has become a byword for perpetual construction, “destined never to end, but to participate in the budget permanently, during which landslides have become a common phenomenon” .
Even the Thumanë–Kashar axis, costing €330 million, remains unfinished, with “unfinished entrances and exits,” “considerable water on the surface,” and “unevenness near all bridges” that “throws cars into the air” .
What is striking, as Panorama notes, is that “while public budget figures are hitting record highs, newly completed roads, paved with asphalt costing millions of euros, are showing structural damage before their first year of use” . This discrepancy “raises serious questions about the efficiency of technical supervision and the standards of materials used” .
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The World Bank Verdict: Spending Without Quality
The World Bank’s 2025 Albania Public Finance Review delivers a damning verdict on this pattern of investment.
According to the report, Albania spends nearly 6% of GDP on public investment—among the highest rates in the region. Yet “the transport network continues to suffer from major problems. Roads are characterized by poor condition, traffic congestion and pollution, while rail and maritime transport remain hampered by outdated infrastructure” .
The Bank estimates that “improving the efficiency of spending on energy and transport could increase the infrastructure index by up to 18.6%” . This would “improve the competitiveness of the economy and the quality of public services, reducing costs for businesses and citizens” .
The report warns that “fiscal risks in Albania are also related to liabilities from state-owned enterprises and public-private partnerships (PPPs), especially in the energy and transport sectors” . The “poor efficiency of public investment remains a persistent concern, increasing pressure on public finances and limiting the effect of investment on economic growth” .
The conclusion is stark: “Albania does not only have a problem with the level of investments in transport, but above all with their quality and efficiency” .
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The Root Cause: When Politics Dictates Projects
What explains this systematic failure? According to journalist Mero Baze, writing in Gazeta Tema, the problem lies not with contractors but with project selection itself.
“The Qukës–Qafë Plloçë road is indeed an economically misguided project,” Baze writes. “The issue is not its role as an alternative link to Korça. The problem lies in the engineering idea behind it” .
Baze traces the project’s origins to decisions made under Prime Minister Sali Berisha, continued under successive ministers, and only finally reaching Balluku. “The engineering study was rushed and superficial. Once construction began, it became obvious that the different sections did not even meet. Extra funds became inevitable” .
He draws parallels to the Tirana–Elbasan road, where “fifty million euros were needed afterwards to stabilise the Krraba landslide that made the road impassable, only because it had been laid on the unstable side of the mountain instead of across the river” .
Or the Gjirokastër–Tepelenë road, where “nearly two kilometres remain unbuilt. After every rain, a piece of the mountain collapses onto the road. The soil must be cleared again and again. It is a losing battle with the terrain—the product of political decisions, not engineering ones” .
“These are design flaws that end up costing the Albanian economy millions of euros,” Baze concludes. “And above all, these projects do not fail because of the construction companies. They build the design they are given” .
In the case of Qukës–Qafë Plloçë, “the road was placed in the worst possible location—a geological cocktail of clays, lignite and fractured rock that turns into mud with the slightest rain. This road will never stabilise unless it is rerouted or unless the entire slope is removed. Either option would deepen the financial hole beyond imagination” .
The fundamental problem, in other words, is that projects are chosen for political visibility, not for engineering soundness or economic return. And once chosen, they are designed, tendered, and supervised in ways that prioritize speed and contractor relationships over quality and durability.
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The Porto Romano Pattern Repeats
Against this backdrop, the Porto Romano procurement looks less like an aberration and more like business as usual.
A feasibility study conducted by a reputable international firm—but one whose conclusions cannot be scrutinized because the study remains secret.
A contract expanded after signing to include NATO requirements that were somehow omitted from the original design.
A designer also serving as judge of competitors—a conflict of interest that the EU has explicitly flagged as incompatible with its standards.
A tender that ultimately collapses, leaving the project in limbo and Albania’s strategic position weakened.
And throughout, a consistent refusal to release documents, answer questions, or submit to public accountability.
This is not how strategic infrastructure is built. This is how money is wasted.
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The Chamber’s Constructive Alternative
The Albanian British Chamber of Commerce and Industry( ABCCI) has watched these developments with growing concern. Its mission includes advocating for “favourable business conditions, regulations, and policies” . The Porto Romano saga, and the broader pattern of infrastructure failure it represents, undermines every aspect of that mission.
But the Chamber is not content merely to criticize. It has developed a set of concrete, practical proposals drawn from UK and international best practice.
- Publish all feasibility studies as a condition of tender
Before any major infrastructure project proceeds, its feasibility study must be made public. This is not merely a transparency measure—it is a check on the kind of “rushed and superficial” engineering that produced the Qukës–Qafë Plloçë disaster. If a study cannot withstand public scrutiny, it should not form the basis for a €1.3bn investment.
- Separate design from evaluation
No company that designs a project should sit on the committee that evaluates bids for its construction. This principle is fundamental to procurement integrity in every functioning system. The EU has flagged Albania’s departure from this principle as a concern. It should be remedied immediately.
- Mandate independent peer review for all projects above €50m
Before tenders proceed, an independent review by internationally accredited engineers—not affiliated with the procuring authority—should validate design assumptions, geotechnical assessments, and cost estimates. This would have flagged the terrain risks at both Librazhd–Pogradec and Porto Romano before construction began.
- Shift to whole-life costing in procurement evaluation
Current tenders often award contracts based on lowest initial price, incentivising contractors to cut corners. The Chamber recommends adopting the “Most Economically Advantageous Tender” (MEAT) criteria that EU directives encourage, which factors in maintenance costs, durability, and design life. The EU report notes that use of MEAT in Albania rose to 41% of contract value in 2024—a positive trend that should become mandatory .
- Establish a specialized infrastructure delivery unit
Modeled on the UK’s Infrastructure and Projects Authority, a dedicated unit within the finance ministry with private-sector secondees and international experts should monitor major projects, track performance against budgets, and intervene early when problems emerge. This addresses the World Bank’s concern about “fragmentation” in capital planning .
- Create a national geotechnical database
Many Albanian road failures result from inadequate understanding of subsurface conditions. A publicly accessible, standardized database of soil and geological data from past projects, funded by a small levy on construction permits, would reduce design uncertainty and prevent the same terrain surprises from recurring.
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A Positive Vision: Corridor VIII Done Right
The Chamber’s constructive approach is already visible in its work on the rail component of Corridor VIII.
In February 2026, ABCCI issued an open call to UK rail infrastructure and engineering firms to participate in the tender for the Durrës–Rrogozhinë railway upgrade—a 34-kilometer project backed by substantial EU financing .
The Chamber is facilitating an online information session with the Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy, developing a B2B online tool to help UK and Albanian companies identify potential partners, and actively encouraging participation by “major multidisciplinary engineering and consulting groups” with experience in “megaschemes and rail corridors” .
This is the alternative to the Porto Romano model: transparent, competitive, international, and focused on long-term value rather than short-term political wins.
As the Chamber notes, the Durrës–Rrogozhinë line is “a key segment of Corridor VIII and Albania’s integration into the wider TEN‑T network, improving freight and passenger flows between the Port of Durrës, the rest of the country and neighbouring markets, and opening new opportunities for logistics, industry and tourism” .
This is what strategic infrastructure looks like when it is done properly.
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Conclusion: A Choice Between Two Paths
Albania stands at a crossroads. One path leads to more Porto Romanos: secret studies, conflicted evaluations, collapsed tenders, and crumbling roads. The other path leads to the kind of transparent, competitive, quality-focused infrastructure development that the Chamber is working to facilitate.
The choice is not abstract. It is visible in every landslide that closes a newly built road, in every cancelled tender that delays strategic investment, and in every feasibility study that remains hidden from public view.
Our Chamber stands ready to help Albania choose the better path. Its proposals are practical, proven, and grounded in the best international practice. They do not require vast new expenditures—only the political will to do things differently.
We are sure the government will listen, if all businesses and institutions alike address these concerns loudly enough.
©2026, ABCCI
